Power of the Powerless

Small island states and climate change

Although Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have contributed a negligible amount to global greenhouse gas emissions they are disproportionately affected by the adverse effects of climate change (Nurse et al., 2014). For this reason, they have actively called for policy on Loss and Damage in the international climate negotiations hosted by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Mechler et al., 2019). However, their participation in the negotiations is restricted by their small delegation sizes which poses challenges to their negotiating capacity compared to larger countries (Betzold et al., 2012).

Broadly speaking, Loss and Damage refers to harms caused by climate change that cannot be avoided through mitigation and adaptation measures (Kreienkamp & Vanhala, 2014). Mitigation is the act of reducing and stabilising the level of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, while adaptation refers to adjustments in human and ecological systems to help them cope with the effects of climate change. However, insufficient mitigation efforts combined with limited adaptation capacities result in unavoidable residual damages.

While Loss and Damage has received support from other developing countries, developed countries have strongly opposed it due to concerns over liability and compensation. Despite the resistance, SIDS have managed to achieve some major victories, such as the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) in 2013 (UNFCCC, 2013) and the inclusion of a separate article on Loss and Damage in the Paris Agreement (Article 8), which established Loss and Damage as the third pillar of the climate regime along with mitigation and adaptation (UNFCCC, 2015). This begs the question of how small states with limited resources and capacity have been able to achieve their demands against the interest of much larger and wealthier states.

SIDS still face some important fights in the Loss and Damage arena, notably on how to raise more finance and whether the WIM should be governed under the COP (the decision-making body of the UNFCCC) or the CMA (the decision-making body of the Paris Agreement). At COP25, SIDS supported joint governance under the COP and the CMA, which would make Loss and Damage a permanent agenda item under the Convention and potentially allow Parties to bypass Paragraph 51 of the Paris Agreement regarding liability and compensation. On the contrary, single governance under the CMA would restrict discussion on Loss and Damage to take place only under the Paris Agreement processes. COP25 and COP26 both concluded without a decision on governance and without responding to developing countries‘ call for a Loss and Damage finance facility. These issues will therefore have to be dealt with in future sessions. But can an understanding of how SIDS have previously asserted power in the negotiations inform a strategy for how to achieve their demands in upcoming negotiations?

Corneloup & Mol (2014) point out that there is a lack of systematic research on the resources and strategies of SIDS in international climate negotiations. Only a few scholars have explored this topic, and none of them address Loss and Damage specifically despite its growing importance in the climate negotiations in recent years. Drawing on my own observations from the Loss and Damage negotiations and insights from my MSc thesis “Understanding the Power Resources of Small Island States in the UNFCCC Loss & Damage Negotiations” (Gurresø, 2020), I examine Corneloup & Mol’s (2014) theory on SIDS’ power in the UNFCCC and propose three recommendations for how they can enhance their influence in the negotiations.

Power in international climate negotiations

Power has many different facets, but ultimately it is the ability to influence, whether directly or indirectly, and to avoid domination by others (Bosch, 2016). In the context of the Loss and Damage negotiations, power can therefore be understood as the ability to influence the outcome of the negotiations by imposing one’s preferences, by reinforcing existing attitudes that support one’s position, or by resisting pressure from opposing Parties.

In a general study on the role of SIDS in the climate negotiations, Corneloup & Mol (2014) presented five types of leadership strategies that can act as a source of negotiating power. It is important to note that these strategies are not mutually exclusive, as SIDS may draw on several or all of them simultaneously.

“Structural leadership” is derived from the possession of material resources and the ability to use those resources effectively. Due to their limited resources, Corneloup & Mol (2014) argue that SIDS do not hold structural power. However, as Young (1991) points out, for small actors structural power can also be achieved through effective coalition building. SIDS have actively pursued this through the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which enables them to collaborate and share resources, and their membership of the Group of 77, which represents all developing countries in the UNFCCC and therefore has a powerful voice in the negotiations.

“Entrepreneurial leadership” arises from the ability to draft mutually acceptable deals and to frame issues in ways that stimulate integrative bargaining. At COP25, SIDS actively exercised this form of leadership by developing bridging proposals to overcome stalemates between the G77 and the developed countries in the Loss and Damage negotiations. Instead of fighting against the demands of developed countries, SIDS instead attempted to include their demands in a way that was more agreeable to themselves and other G77 members. Entrepreneurial leadership was also exercised through side events that influenced the discourse on Loss and Damage.

“Intellectual leadership” is exercised through the production of intellectual capital and/or systems of thought that shape actors’ perspectives on relevant issues. This mostly occurs outside of the negotiations, although SIDS actively draw on and promote scientific knowledge in the negotiations to support their demands. As such, the fifth IPCC report, which was released one year before the Paris Agreement was finalised, was influential in establishing Loss and Damage as a separate article, due to its finding that losses and damages from climate change are likely to occur despite mitigation and adaptation efforts.

“Environmental leadership” comes from domestic policies and practices that reflect high levels of ambition and thereby strengthen the legitimacy of an actor in the negotiations. For instance, SIDS framed their mitigation plans to align with the 1.5oC target to support their demand for an ambitious temperature target. At COP25 I did not observe any examples of SIDS promoting domestic practices related to Loss and Damage, although such practices do exist. For instance, Tuvalu has established a Survival Fund to respond to losses and damages experienced by local communities.

“Moral leadership” arises from SIDS’ storyline which centres on their high vulnerability to climate change despite their negligible contribution to global emissions. In the Loss and Damage negotiations, SIDS have repeatedly drawn attention to the historical responsibility of developed countries and raised concrete examples of losses and damages in SIDS caused by climate change.

Recommendations for strengthening the influence of SIDS

Based on leadership strategies proposed by Corneloup & Mol (2014) and conversations with actors involved with the Loss and Damage negotiations, I identify the following opportunities for how SIDS can enhance their influence in future meetings:

1. “Collaborate more with foreign civil society actors“ – Coalition-building is not limited to inter-state cooperation. Indeed, collaboration with civil society actors on lobbying efforts can constitute an effective channel to influence Western governments. Civil society often have close ties with their national governments, and SIDS can leverage that in two ways. Firstly, during COP civil society can provide insights into their own governments’ positions and rationale. However, the most important form of collaboration with civil society should take place outside of the COPs. Negotiators are tied to a mandate that is decided prior to the negotiations, thereby limiting the influence that civil society and foreign governments can assert during COP. Collaborating with foreign civil society groups throughout the year to promote certain issues and to shape public discourse in their countries would enable SIDS to indirectly influence the political agenda going in to the negotiations.
2. « Promote domestic efforts related to Loss and Damage » – SIDS could do more to assert environmental leadership in the Loss and Damage negotiations by promoting their domestic actions related to the issue. One example is Tuvalu’s Survival Fund which is a national fund set up to support its population deal with losses and damages caused by the impacts of climate change. By showcasing these domestic initiatives, they can position themselves as role models and put moral pressure on developed countries to increase financial contributions.
3. “Produce a Loss and Damage finance gap report” – In order to strengthen their demands for more finance for Loss and Damage, SIDS need to assert more intellectual leadership. Without concrete estimates for how much finance is needed and how much is currently available, developed countries are too easily able to deflect SIDS’ demands by referring to the climate finance that they already contribute to funds like the Green Climate Fund. UNEP (2020) produces an annual Adaptation Gap Report, which focuses on financing and implementation for adaptation, and SIDS should encourage a similar report on Loss and Damage. In addition to providing leverage in formal negotiations, a finance gap report could also be used as a tool for foreign civil society actors to lobby their governments.

With this article, I have contributed to the understanding of SIDS in international climate negotiations by applying the literature on leadership strategies to their role in the Loss and Damage negotiations. Based on this, I have proposed three ways in which SIDS can enhance their influence to achieve their demands at COP27 and other future Loss and Damage negotiations; collaboration with civil society outside of COP, promote domestic efforts related to Loss and Damage, and produce a Loss and Damage finance gap report.